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GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION: A CHALLENGE TO
THE CANADIAN REFUGEE DETERMINATION SYSTEM
HEATHER POTTERt

The definition of a refugee contained in the Canadian Immigration Act
requires that refugee claimants establish a well-founded fear of persecution
based on one of the enumerated grounds, namely race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. As "sex" is not
enumerated, many women must establish their claim on the basis of
"membership in a particular social group. " The standard of internal cohesion
that the courts employed in defining a "particular social group" severely
restricted the grounds available to women claiming refugee status. New
guidelines, encourage the acceptance of claims of gender-based persecution
under the enumerated categories. Recent cases indicate a willingness to view
claimants of gender-based discrimination as members of a "particular social
group, " but these claims must still satisfj a stringent test to establish
"persecution" and "state complicity. " The guidelines, while a positive
development, remain an inadequate substitute for the inclusion of sex as an
enumerated ground.
La definition de rtfjugie de la Loi sur l'Immigration du Canada requiere
qu 'un requerant etablft u.ne crainte de persecution bien fondee basee sur un
des criteres enumeres, a savoir, la race, la religion, la nationalite, le fait d'etre
membre d'un groupe social particulier, et !es opinions politiques. Puisque le
"sexe" n'est pas un fondement enumere, plusieurs femmes doivent etablir leur
demande sur la base de "membre d'un groupe social particulier. " La norme
de coherence interne que !es courts indique que la definition de "groupe social
particulier" restreint severement !es fondements disponibles pour !es femmes
demandant le statut de refugie. Des nouvelles directives encouragent
!'acceptation de demandes fondees sur la persecution basee sur le sexe sous
!'egide des categories enumerees. Des affaires recentes indiquent une volonte
de considerer !es requerants invoquant la discrimination basee sur le sexe
comme membre d'un groupe social particulier; cependant ces demandes
doivent toujours satisfaire le test severe de ''persecution" ainsi que de la
"complicite de l'etat. "Les directives, tout en constituant un developpement
encourageant, demeure une alternative inadequate a !'inclusion du sexe
comme une categorie enumeree.
t B.A. (Wilfred Laurier), M.A. (York), LLB. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie).
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The international community is confronted with the challenge of
dealing with the world's increasing refugee population in a humane
and compassionate way. Some of these refugees are women fleeing
gender-based persecution. Women who confront or are oppressed by
patriarchal institutions often have no choice but to move elsewhere.
However, there is uncertainty as to whether the protection extended
to Convention refugees in Canada should also be extended to
women fleeing gender-based persecution. In the past year, the
refugee determination system has been heavily criticized by human
rights and feminist groups for its treatment of female refugee
claimants.
Much of the controversy has centred on two high profile cases.
Nada, a Saudi Arabian woman, claimed refugee status on the basis
of a fear that she would be arrested and possibly tortured by the
Saudi religious police. Nada refused to wear a veil and submit to
other restrictions placed on women in Saudi Arabia. She had been
attacked and beaten by Islamic fundamentalists for this behaviour. 1
Dularie Boodlal, a Trinidadian woman, claimed refugee status on
the basis that she was a victim of domestic violence. She had sought
the aid of the Trinidadian police on several occasions, but they refused to protect her from her violent spouse. 2
Both women's claims were rejected although they were eventually allowed to remain in Canada. Responding to public pressure,
then Immigration Minister Bernard Valcourt exercised his discretion under section 114(2) of the Immigration Act3 and granted
asylum on the basis of "compassionate and humanitarian considerations." This involved no change to Canadian law, but allowed for
an exception to regular practice. It did not address the future
claims of women refugees, nor did it confront the gendered nature
of the refugee determination process. In March of 1993, largely in
response to political pressure mounted by feminist and refugee
rights groups, new guidelines were introduced to provide assistance
to the Refugee Determination Board in dealing with claims of gender persecution.
The guidelines, although a positive step towards addressing the
plight of women refugees, are not sufficient in and of themselves.
This paper focusses on the need for a definition of refugee which
1
2

3

Canadian Press (29 January 1993).
Canadian Press (16 September 1992.)
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.
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incorporates the needs and experiences of women fleeing genderbased persecution. It is divided into three sections. The first section
provides an overview of the criteria used to determine refugee status
in Canada by focussing on the definition of "particular social
group" and by providing some international comparisons. The second section focusses on how women's claims for refugee status may
be brought in Canada by looking at various cases. Since women can
only claim refugee status on the basis of one of the enumerated
grounds in the Immigration Act, it is necessary to analyze how the
courts interpret the various grounds, how these interpretations potentially affect women, and finally how the courts have responded
to the new guidelines issued in March of 1993. The final section of
the paper focusses on alternative approaches to dealing with genderbased persecution. Women fleeing gender-based persecution require
more than what the Canadian system offers. Neither solely
incorporating women fleeing gender-based persecution into one of
the enumerated grounds, nor relying on guidelines that are not
binding, will satisfy the needs of these women refugees.
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS

In 1985, the United Nations estimated that there were ten million
refugees world wide, two-thirds of whom were women and children. 4 Canada, in accordance with its international and humanitarian
commitments, admitted 26,575 refugees in 1988. 59% of those
accepted in the refugee class were male and 41 % were female; a
widening of the gender gap from the 1980 figures of 56% male and
44% female. 5 Many of these women came to Canada as the
dependents of male refugees and did not attempt to claim refugee
status in independent claims. 6 When they did make independent
4 Refugee here refers to displaced persons generally rather than to the strict
legal definition of a Convention refugee in The Activities and Programmes of the
United Nations High Commissioner far Refugees on Behalf of Refugee Women, UN
Doc. A/CONF.116/11, 30 Apr. 1985 at 5, para. 14. This is a conservative
estimate. The U.S. Committee for Refugees in its World Survey--1991 estimated
17 million refugees worldwide.
5 Employment and Immigration Canada, Immigration to Canada: A Statistical
Overview, IM 062/11/89.
6 I am not aware of any statistics available on this issue but see for example
Sittampa!am (Re) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 287 (Imm. & Ref. BO., Re£ Div).
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claims, women generally claimed refugee status according to the
traditionally defined grounds of what constitutes a refugee.
Section 2 of the Immigration Act states:
"Convention refugee" means any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion,
(i) is outside the country of the person's nation ality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country, or
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside
the country of the person's former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is
unwilling to return to that country, and
(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee by
virtue of subsection (2),
but does not include any person to whom the Convention
does not apply pursuant to Section E or F of Article 1
thereof, which sections are set out in the schedule to this
Act. 7
Similar to many other countries, Canada incorporated into domestic legislation the international definition of a refugee that is found
in the 19 51 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 8 and in the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 9
The definition requires that refugee claimants establish a wellfounded fear of persecution, and that the persecution is based on one
7 Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, as am. by R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28,
s. 1(2).
8 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]. Article l(A)(2) of
the Convention defines a refugee as someone who,

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outide the country of his
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
9 31January1967, G.A. Res. 2198 (XX.I), 21 GAOR, Supp (No. 16), U.N. Doc.
N6316 (1966).
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of the enumerated grounds, namely race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Persecution on the basis of sex is not listed in the definition. Thus,
women fleeing gender-based persecution cannot bring their claim
specifically on the basis of sex. Instead, they must establish their
eligibility for refugee status under one of the other headings. While
there is the potential to base a claim for refugee status on any of the
enumerated grounds, membership in a "particular social group" is
often seen as the most viable route for women fleeing gender-based
persecution.

International Definition of a Social Group
"Particular social group" was not defined in the 1951 Convention.
David Neal emphasizes that "social group" was intended as a residual category for asylum seekers who did not fall into one of the
other enumerated areas. He suggests that the drafters of the
Convention recognized that groups worthy of protection would inevitably appear who could not be anticipated in 1951. The drafters
of the Convention therefore, left the boundaries of the social group
category undefined in order to retain flexibility for the future. 10
James Hathaway cautions against using the concept of "particular
social group" as an all-encompassing residual category. He notes
that the drafters of the Convention clearly distinguished between
those whose fear was attributable to their civil and political status,
and those whose fear was caused by other factors. 11 Nevertheless,
while Hathaway clearly sees gender as falling within the ambit of a
particular social group, his focus on civil and political status may
be unnecessarily limiting as it would require a recognition on the
part of decision makers that many of the gendered institutions that
are oppressive to women are socially and politically constructed,
rather than being natural and immutable.
Various approaches to the term "particular social group" have
been adopted within the international community. Some of these
are highly influential in Canadian courts, others less so. In 1988, the
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees published the
Handbook of Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.
IO D. L. Neal, "Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution
as a Grounds for Asylum" (1988) 20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 203 at 229.
11 J.C. Hathaway, The Law ofRefugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at
159.
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It provides a generalized starting point for determining membership in a social group and focusses on the internal cohesion of a social group. Paragraph 77 states:
A particular social group normally comprises persons of
similar background, habits, or social status .... A claim
to fear of persecution may frequently overlap with a fear
of persecution on other grounds, i.e .. race, religion or nationality.12

The requirement of internal cohesion may be problematic, especially since there is often the additional expectation that a particular social group should pose a threat to the state. M. Jane
Kronenberger notes,
Thus, it is often the government itself which determines
the contours of the group which it deems to be a threat to
its continued rule. The inquiry of the court in ascertaining
the identifiability of a particular social group must,
therefore, focus on the role of the agents of persecution in
attributing certain characteristics to a group and singling
it out for persecution. There may be historic and
political reasons for middle class women to defy strict
Islamic decrees, but this does not mean that a group must
have formed internally to oppose the regime before a
claim arising from persecution based on social group
membership can be established. Refugee determination
should be based on the government's attribution of characteristics to a "particular social group" that it has chosen
to persecute. 13

U.S. jurisprudence has adopted a narrower definition of social
group which demands a high level of group cohesion. The U.S.
Court of Appeal defined "particular social group" in SanchezTrujillo v. INS.:
The statutory words "particular" and "social" which
modify "group," ... indicate that the term does not encompass every broadly defined segment of a population,
even if a certain demographic division does have some
12 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva: Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1988).
l3 M. Jane Kronenberger, "Refugee Women: Establishing a Prima Facie Case
Under the Refugee Convention" (1992) 15 ILSAJ. Int'!. L. 61at76.
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statistical relevance. Instead, the phrase "particular social
group" implies a collection of people closely affiliated
with each other, who are actuated by some common im pulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a
voluntary associational relationship among the purported
members, which imparts some common characteristic
that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that
discrete social group. 14
The Canadian system has been resistant to the limited interpretation espoused in Sanchez-Trujillo. Sanchez-Trujillo was denied
refugee status because "young El Salvadorean males of military
age" did not constitute a particular social group. Significantly, the
Canadian Immigration Appeal Board made the opposite ruling in
Marco Antonio Valladares Escoto v. M.E.J. 15
The European Parliament determined in 1984 that women with
a well founded fear of persecution because they have "transgressed
social mores" should be considered a particular social group under
the Convention refugee definition. 16 The High Commissioner acknowledged the existence of gender-based persecution in the "Note
on Refugee Women and International Protection." 17 He suggested
that it may be appropriate to adopt the reasoning of the European
Parliament, especially in light of the U.N.'s commitment to
gender equality as evidenced by the Convention on the Elimination
ofAll Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women. 18
The European Parliament definition expands the definition of
social group to identify certain groups of women. However, it does
not provide protection for women fleeing domestic violence who
cannot be said to have "transgressed the social mores of the society
in which they live." Canada has recognized the limitation of this
definition proposed by the European Parliament, and, in certain
cases, Canadian courts have further expanded the types of claims
women can make under the "social group" category. Nevertheless,

14

801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) at 1576.
1988) Imm. Appeal Board Decision 111.8.
l6 European Parliament Resolution (April 13, 1984) discussed by S. Forbes
Martin in Refagee Women (New Jersey: Zed Book, 1992) at 24-25; see also
Kronenburger, supra note 13 at 62-63.
l7 UNHCR 1990e. The U.N. Note is discussed in Forbes Martin, ibid. at 2425.
18 (1979), 1249 U.N.T.S.13, 1982 Can T.S. No. 31.
15 CT une
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Canada has yet to enunciate a clear test which will provide protection for all women fleeing gender-based persecution.

CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE

For a number of years, Canada recognized social group claims only
when the social group could establish a nexus to one of the other four
enumerated grounds of civil or political status. 19 The court stated in

Obertz Belfond:
Either the group must be political and proclaim and ex hibit dissidence with the regime or be a religious sect
which has been persecuted by the civil authorities because
of its religious beliefs. In a multinational state, a racial
minority might also constitute such a group. 20
In later decisions, the courts have moved away from this narrow
approach in order to endow "particular social group" with a wider
meaning. Courts and tribunals were quite flexible in their approach
to what constitutes a social group and, at times, were receptive to
the claims of women. The Immigration Appeal Board decided in
Zekiye Incirciyan 21 that single Turkish women living in a Moslem
country without the protection of a male relative constituted a particular social group. The Immigration and Refugee Board reached
similar decisions for Moslem women in Lebanon and for Tamil
Women in Sri Lanka. 22 The courts, however, have not attempted to
develop a comprehensive test for the determination of a particular
social group until recently. Three recent decisions provide some
indication of where the refugee determination system may be
heading on this issue.
1. Canada (Attorney General) v. W ard23

Ward is the leading case on what constitutes "particular social
group." It dealt with a former Irish National Liberation Army
Hathaway, supra note 11at157-158.
(1975),10 IAC 208 at 222, cited in Hathaway, supra note 11at157.
21 (10 August 1987) Imm. Appeal Board Decision M87-1541X, quoted in
Hathaway, supra note 11 at 162.
22 Imm. Ref. B. Decision T89-00260, July 1989 and M89-0213, June 1989,
quoted in Hathaway ibid. at 162.
23 (1990), 108 N.R. 60 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Ward].
!9
20
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(INLA) supporter who attempted to disassociate himself from the
organization after releasing two of the hostages he had been assigned
to guard. He was court-martialled by the INLA and sentenced to
death. Mr Ward sought refugee status in Canada.
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal rejected Ward's
claim that the INLA constituted a "particular social group."
However, both the majority and the minority decisions endorsed a
purposive interpretation of "particular social group" in light of section 3(g) of the Immigration Act which states the objective of the
Act:
To fulfil Canada's international legal obligations with
respect to refugees, and to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted.

In defining social group, Urie, J.A., for the majority, reasoned
that persecution for membership in a social group can only occur
when the group's activities are perceived to be a possible danger to
the state:
It is implicit from the foregoing that the persecution

arising from membership in a social group must arise
from its activities perceived to be a possible danger of
some kind to the government. 24
While internal cohesion in membership is one criteria, establishing a
refugee claim on the basis of membership in a "particular social
group" requires that the group pose a threat to the state and that the
fear of persecution be connected to this threat. Urie, ].A. found that
Ward's fear was not directed at the state but at INLA which
viewed him as a traitor, and had sentenced him to death. Thus, the
claimant's fear arose from within the group itself; it was not linked
to the state. It could be argued that this restricted definition was intended, for policy reasons, to exclude terrorists from the social
group category and should not be applied too broadly.
MacGuigan, J .A., in dissent, adopted a more liberal interpretation of social group. He drew a clear distinction between natural
and non-natural groups. He noted that characteristics of a non-natural
social group included members united in a stable association for

24

Ibid

at

65.
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common purposes. 25 Using this definition, he was prepared to find
that INLA constituted a social group.
The majority and minority decisions differed greatly on the
understanding of persecution. Urie, J.A., for the majority, accepted
that state complicity is a prerequisite for establishing persecution.
MacGuigan, J.A., in dissent, argued that it is sufficient that the state
is unable to protect the individual.
The majority decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Ward
makes it difficult for women to advance refugee claims. Women
who are persecuted for their failure to conform to traditional social
customs would need to establish that their actions were perceived as
a threat to the state, rather than as an issue of morality. Jacqueline
Greatbatch argues convincingly that women's resistance to the
wearing of the chador in Iran challenges Islamic fundamentalism
which is the basis of state power, and is, therefore, a threat to the
state. However, because of the distinction drawn between public and
private life, and the delegation of women's activities to the private
sphere, it is difficult to convince refugee boards of the political
nature of these women's actions. 26
The Federal Court of Appeal decision in Ward was overturned
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward v M.E.l. 27 La Forest, J.
defined a "particular social group" to include:
(1) groups defined by innate or unchangeable characteristics
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they
should not be forced to forsake that association
(3) groups associated by former voluntary status unalterable due to its historic importance. 28

La Forest, J. found that INLA did not meet this definition of a
"particular social group," but went on to decide that Ward was being persecuted on the basis of political opinion.
The application of the definition of the Supreme Court of
Canada as it relates to women seeking refugee status is somewhat

25 Ibid.

at 72.
J. Greatbatch, "The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of Refugee
Discourse" (1989) 1 Int'lJ. Refug. L. 518 at 519-523.
27 (1993), 20 Imm. LR. (2d) 85 (S.C.C.).
2s Ibid. at 121-122.
26
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uncertain. La Forest, J. quoted with approval M.M. v. M.E.J.29 and
Cheungv. M.E.J.,30 both of which contemplate gender as the basis of
membership in a particular social group. In these cases gender was
viewed as an innate and immutable characteristic. However, case
law has developed whereby women are required to establish their
claim as a sub-group, such as "women who are victims of domestic
violence," in order to advance refugee claims of a gender-based
nature. It is not clear whether such a sub-group would meet the
requirements of the test La Forest, J. establishes. Women within
these sub-groups are often isolated from other women in the same
position and they do not necessarily constitute a voluntary organization. Finally, neither the failure to comply with traditional social
mores, nor the fact that they are battered, is an unchangeable or innate characteristic.
In his decision, La Forest, J. also considered the issue of persecution in relation to a claim for refugee status. He concluded that an
applicant could meet the social group category either by establishing state complicity or the state's inability to provide
protection for the applicant. In situations where state officials have
admitted that they are unable to provide protection, or where the
applicant can demonstrate this inability through clear and
convincing evidence, persecution may be established. It is only in
situations in which state protection might reasonably have been
forthcoming that the claimant's failure to approach the state for
protection will defeat the claim.3 1 This finding is important
because it allows for a positive ruling in situations where the person
is being persecuted by someone other than the state.
For women fleeing domestic violence, however, gathering evidence and establishing state complicity is difficult since their
claim of persecution derives from a shared cultural understanding of
the state agent and the batterer which defines women as unworthy of
protection.

29
30

[1992] F.C.J. No. 1077 (QL).
(1993), 19 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81 (F.C.A).

3l This is in line with the Federal Court of Appeal position subsequent to its
decision in Wara'. See for example, Salibian v. MEL (1990), 73 D.L.R. (4th) 5 51
(F.CA).
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2. N.(L.X) (Re),3 2 (Inaudi)

In lnaudi, the Immigration and Refugee Board addressed the definition of social group in reaching its decision that homosexuals in
Argentina constitute a "social group" within the meaning of Section
2(1) of the Immigration Act. Teitelbaum, one of the adjudicators in
this hearing, held that since social group was not defined by the
Immigration Act, the words should be given their ordinary or usual
meaning. She adopted the Oxford dictionary definition of "social"
as "capable of being associated or united" and the definition of
"group" as "a number of persons classed together on account of a
certain degree of similarity. "33 Colle, the other adjudicator in this
hearing, adopted a more restrictive definition of social group. The
definition reads:
People in social groups are conscious of belonging together in common memberships, and a group possesses
some mechanism to determine who belongs and who does
not. 34
Considering the wide diversity among women, it is uncertain
whether women are encompassed by either of these definitions.
However, both board members were willing to find that homosexuals were encompassed by the definition. Homosexuals, like
women, also come from a variety and backgrounds and lead widely
diverse lives. However, in this case the Board focussed on the "gay
lifestyle" of the refugee claimant and on societal stereotypes. In this
way they found common membership in a "social group." It may be
difficult to establish an equivalent commonality of a shared female
culture. The definitions of "social" put forward by both adjudicators may effectively exclude women since their persecution
results more from the status ascribed to them in a patriarchal society than from any sense of self-definition from within the group.
Both board members in lnaudi placed considerable emphasis on
the fact that a social group should be based on an immutable characteristic. Teitelbaum refused to state categorically that homosexuality was an immutable characteristic and qualified "particular social group" to include voluntary conditions which are so fundamen-

32 [1992] C.R.D.D. No. 47 [hereinafter lnaudi].
33/bid.
34 Ibid.
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tal to a person's identity that a complainant ought not to be compelled to change it.

3. M.M. v. M.E.J.35
M.M. involved the judicial review of the decision of a Credible
Basis Panel. It is one of the few cases dealing directly with genderbased persecution. The case indicates that individual women applicants must base their claims for refugee status within particular
"sub-groups" of women. M.M. was a Trinidadian woman who was
subject to domestic violence. She was unable to gain the protection
of the Trinidadian state because of the indifference of its authorities.
In M.M the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument
that its decision in Ward applied as precedent. The Court found
that Ward did not propose any workable test for the recognition of
other social group claims. In addition, it held that the facts in Ward
were so different from the present case as to make Ward inapplicable. When M.M. was decided Ward had not yet been argued before
the Supreme Court of Canada. It is a matter of speculation whether
the Federal Court would have felt constrained by the test of a social
group established by La Forest, J. It is not clear whether the subgroup of "Trinidadian women subject to domestic violence" could
meet the requirements of his test.
The Federal Court of Appeal in MM. stated that while women
may constitute a social group, they cannot correctly be characterized as a particular social group within the meaning of the statute.
Thus, the group must be limited to "Trinidadian women subject to
wife abuse." Felicite Stairs and Lori Pope, two scholars in this area,
recognize that this constitutes a potential problem because once a
woman is removed from a battering situation she is no longer a
member of that social group, even though she will revert back to
that status if her refugee claim is denied. 36 The Federal Court of
Appeal concluded its decision by stating:
A question may be posed for the future; since, in this
context, persecution must be feared by reason of membership in a particular social group, can fear of that perseSupra note 29 [hereinafter MM].
Felicite Stairs and Lori Pope, "No Place Like Home: Assaulted Migrant
Women's Claims to Refugee Status and Landings on Humanitarian and
Compassionate Grounds" (1990) 6 ]. L. & Social Pol'y 148 at 172-173.
35

36
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cution be the sole distinguishing factor that results in what
is at most merely a social group becoming a particular
social group. 37
Clearly this is the argument women need to make in order to seek
recognition as a particular social group. They must establish their
membership in a sub-group of women, such as those who are victims
of domestic violence, or those who transgress social mores, and
establish that this sub-group possesses sufficient common characteristics to constitute a particular social group.
Canadian courts and immigration tribunals have, in some instances, been willing to extend protection to vulnerable groups, including certain sub-groups of women. This seems to provide sporadic protection. Because there exists no well established test for
determining what constitutes a social group, much is left to the discretion of individual adjudicators. While women fleeing persecution may continue to base their claims on membership in a social
group, or on their political beliefs, immigration lawyers say that
their success with such cases is poor and often depends upon the
constitution of the Refugee Board that hears the case. 38 On March 9,
1993, a set of guidelines was issued by the Immigration and
Refugee Board.3 9 The new guidelines represent a significant liberalization of the Board's approach to gender-based persecution.
The new guidelines encourage those claiming gender-based persecution to incorporate their claims under one of the other enumerated
grounds. The guidelines emphasize that gender often intercepts with
other forms of persecution. They purport to deal with most genderbased claims involving women who have transgressed religious or
social norms under the enumerated categories of religion and
political opinion. The guidelines explicitly recognize that women
who are exposed to violence, and are unprotected, are encompassed
under the heading of membership in a social group. A discussion of
several cases decided under the new gender guidelines follows.

37 MM v. ME.I, supra note 29 at 10.
38

Canadian Press (25 September 1992).
Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines Issued by the Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, 9 March 1990.
39
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4. C.(X.N.) (Re)4o
The C.(XN) (Re) case involved an Ecuadorian woman who claimed
that she was subject to domestic abuse and that the Ecuadorian
government was unwilling to protect her. The Canadian Refugee
Determination Division [hereafter C.R.D.D.J determined that
women who were subject to domestic violence shared a similar
background and therefore constituted a particular social group. This
reasoning is somewhat surprising considering the vast differences
that exist among battered women.
After accepting that women subject to domestic violence
constitute a social group, the tribunal considered whether the state
was unwilling to protect the refugee claimant. Extensive evidence
was presented to show that battered women were afforded little
protection by the Ecuadorian state, including reports by various
agencies and organizations, and evidence that domestic violence is
not a crime in Ecuador and therefore does not carry any type of
punishment. The C.R.D .D. accepted this evidence as proof of state
complicity and accepted the refugee application of C(X.N.).
The decision of the C.R.D.D. in C(XN) has not always been
duplicated in other decisions involving victims of domestic violence. In both A.(I.E.)(Re)41 and N(L.Y.) (Re)4 2 the C.R.D.D.
accepted that women who were victims of domestic violence qualified as members of a social group. However, both these women
were unable to establish the complicity of the Jamaican or
Grenadian states, and thus their refugee claims failed. It should be
noted that neither women had access to the type of expert evidence
offered by C(X.N.) in the Ecuadorian case, and both Jamaica and
Grenada had formal laws prohibiting domestic violence.

5. X.(G.C.) (Re) 43
In this case, a woman from China was in contravention of the state's
one-child-only policy when she became pregnant with her second
child. As a result, she experienced a forced abortion, had her business license withdrawn, and was sought by the state for compulsory
sterilization. It was accepted that the claimant was entitled to seek
40

4I
42
43

[1993)
[1993)
[1993)
[1993)

C.R.D.D No. 28 (QL).
C.R.D.D. No. 111 (QL).
C.R.D.D. No. 55 (QL).
C.R.D.D. No. 64 (QL).

96

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

refugee status on the grounds of political opinion with little discussion. Furthermore, since the state was the agent of persecution, there
was no issue of state complicity. The Board determined that the
claimant had good grounds to fear persecution if she was forced to
return to China.
The gender guidelines encourage the acceptance of gender-based
persecution under various grounds, including membership in a social
group and political opinion, with very little discussion. Thus, it is
easier for women to get past this preliminary hurdle. However, in
making such determinations, the board seems to be focussing on
what constitutes state complicity. Thus, in cases like X (G. C.) (Re),
where the state is clearly the agent of persecution, it is much easier
for a woman to make a claim of gender-based persecution. In cases
involving domestic violence, it is more difficult to establish state
complicity.

6. Y.(R.W.) (Re)44
Y. (R. W) (Re) involved a Muslim woman from Algeria who
escaped to Canada in order to avoid being forced into an arranged
marriage. She claimed persecution on the grounds of religion, and
argued that she feared her father would kill her for refusing to conform to the Islamic way of life by failing to accept the arranged
marriage. The C.R.D.D. readily accepted that women who
transgress the traditional mores of society in Muslim countries are
persecuted on the basis of religious belief.
The Tribunal focussed predominately on state complicity to
persecution. They found that Y.(R.W.) could not obtain state protection because her father was a well-known religious authority, both
in his community and throughout Algeria.
Y.(R. W) (Re) forms an interesting contrast to N.(L.Y.) (Re). 45 In
N. (L. Y.) (Re) the C.R.D.D. failed to accept that N.(L.Y.) was
unable to seek police protection from domestic violence. She testified that Grenadian police do not take domestic violence very seriously and that it was futile to seek police protection because her father was a member of the police department. She testified that although her father no longer held a prominent position because he had
been demoted as a result of alcohol problems, he still wielded
44 [1993] C.R.D.D. No. 54 (QL).
45

Supra note 42.
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considerable influence within the police department. In N. (L. Y.)
(Re) the C.R.D.D. was unwilling to accept state complicity to persecution because of the institutional position held by the perpetrator
of the violence. Yet they accepted that argument in Y. (R. W) (Re).
The new guidelines appear to effectively address the concerns of
women who have transgressed the traditional mores of society.
These women are able to establish their claim under the established
grounds of religion or political opinion, and there is a willingness
in the C.R.D.D. to accept state complicity to their persecution.
However, state complicity is more difficult to establish in cases of
domestic violence. It may be that in considering persecution, a tribunal is more willing to accept state complicity in "exotic" situations such as sterilization in China or forced marriages in Algeria.
Situations involving domestic violence are often disturbingly
familiar.
APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH
GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION

There are two approaches to dealing with gender-based persecution.
One approach advocates the incorporation of gender-based persecution under one of the enumerated grounds, whether it be religion,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. This
approach emphasizes that gender often intersects with other forms of
persecution. This is the position advocated by the guidelines. The
other approach favours identifying sex specifically as a ground for
establishing a refugee claim.
The new guidelines outline how claims of gender-based persecution can fit within the current definitions of persecution under the
other enumerated categories. Thus, for example, a woman may
claim that reprisals for failure to observe traditional Islamic
custom constitutes religious-based persecution.
The current definition of religious persecution appears to be
broad enough to encompass persecution within a religious group.
Hathaway suggests that the definition of religious persecution at international law includes the right to hold or not to hold any particular religious belief, and the right to practice any religion, including
participation in, or abstinence from, formal worship and religious
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practices. 46 The Immigration Appeal Board has accepted that religious behaviour includes more than formal acts of worship and
may encompass other acts of political significance. In Luis Alberto
Mena Ramirezv. M.E.I. the Immigration Appeal Board found that
conscientious objection to military service constituted a religious
belief. They stated:
the Board [found] a systematic persecution by reason of
religion. It is the failure of the recruiting system to make
allowances for the convictions of the conscientious objector that forms the basis of the fear. Such a failure amounts
to fear of persecution within the meaning of the Act. 47

This is similar to the situation in some Islamic countries where
state laws fail to accommodate those individuals who do not
follow the predominant religion or some tenets of it.
Establishing religious persecution also requires that state involvement in the persecution, or in the state's failure to protect the
individual, be proved. Thus, women fleeing gender-based persecution in some Islamic states should be able to claim persecution on
the basis of religion under the current definition.
Women who are victims of violence could possibly bring their
claim under the enumerated ground of political opinion. In LazoMajano v. l.NS., 48 the U.S. Court of Appeal granted refugee status
to an El Salvadorean woman who had been physically and sexually
abused by a low ranking member of the military. She sought
asylum on the basis of political opinion. Noonan, J. stated:
So in this case, if the situation is seen in its social context,
Zuniga is asserting the political opinion that a man has a
right to dominate and he has persecuted Olimpia to force
her to accept this opinion without rebellion. 49

Thus, the U.S. Court has expressed some willingness to examine the
ideological underpinnings of violence against women under the
category of political opinion. The case was not, however, decided
46 Supra note 11 at 145-146. This is based on Hathaway's analysis of the Draft
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, UN Doc. E/1980/13 and the Universal
Declaration ofHuman Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948.
47 (May 1988) Imm. Appeal Board Decision 110.15.
48 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
49 Ibid at 1435.
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on this basis. The Court, in making its decision, reverted to a more
traditional analysis of political opinion as holding views subversive
to the government.
It may be possible to construct a successful argument for recognizing gender-based persecution as an element of political opinion. If so, this would be a positive development because it would
then be recognized that women's relationships, often confined to the
private sphere, are indeed political. However, the opinion of
Noonan, J. in Lazo-Majano was particularly enlightened and is unlikely to gain widespread acceptance by Canadian courts. The new
guidelines seem to reject this possibility, preferring to deal with
women fleeing domestic violence under membership in a particular
social group.
James Hathaway has raised concerns about enumerating sex as a
ground for refugee status. He states:
The problem is that if one, at this stage pursues the inclusion of gender and leaves aside all of these other im portant categories that have seen to be without the social
group category, I think that you end up privileging one
form of disenfranchisement over all of the others. so
This argument would tend to favour pursuing gender-based
claims under the category of particular social group. Undoubtedly,
the inclusion of sex as a grounds for a refugee claim would provide
express protection to women. However, any gains made by women
in the "particular social group" category would benefit other disadvantaged groups that are less mobilized.
Jacqueline Greatbatch adopts this position. She argues that adequate protection for women lies not merely in creating a separate
female paradigm for gender-based claims but in the development
of a broader human rights paradigm.5 1 There is a concern that establishing sex as a separate category will lead to the
marginalization of women's concerns rather than establishing them
as significant and compelling human rights. However, women can
forge alliances with other disenfranchised groups and agitate for the
development of a broader human rights paradigm while still
seeking explicit statutory rights for women. By entrenching their
so Estanislao Oziewicz, "Why a Change of Heart Does Not Change Policy"
Globe and Mail (5 February 1993).
5! Supra note 26 at 526.
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position, women may actually make the position of other groups
stronger.
A major concern with the guidelines is that they are more susceptible to change than legislation and may be altered once the political pressure mobilized around the issue of gender-based persecution subsides. The guidelines are not binding on members of the
refugee board and do not constitute official government policy or
law.
Tribunals are not bound by precedent established at other tri.bunal hearings, so the guidelines do not establish an authoritative
body of case law. Lee Cohen, an immigration lawyer in Halifax,
Nova Scotia suggests that refugee boards are often very conservative
and that the guidelines may be more influential at the appeal
level.52 The guidelines may act to persuade the court to broaden the
definition of a particular social group established by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Ward v. M.E.f.5 3 Until this happens, however,
the decisions made under the guidelines have no precedent-setting
authority.
The guidelines simply encourage an interpretation of the
Convention refugee definition which recognizes gender-related
claims. They seek to promote consistency in refugee board decisions. They do not carry statutory authority which is the major advantage of including gender explicitly as a grounds for claiming
refugee status.
It has been suggested that the definition of a Convention
refugee, drafted in 19 51 before the modern feminist movement,
should be updated to include persecution on the basis of sex. There
is, however, some concern that any amendment to the definition of a
Convention refugee in the Immigration Act to include gender may
disturb its integrity at international law. James Hathaway, has
stated:

If we were

to reopen it for this in the age of
restrictionism in which we now live, there is an
overwhelming probability that a lot of the protections
that refugees currently enjoy would be taken out of the
Convention. There is a big, big risk factor if you are

52

Lecture at Dalhousie Law School, Halifax, N.S., 18 March 1993.

53

Supra note 27.
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going to re-open an international Convention in an era
when Canada is the best player on a bad team.5 4
This is unconvincing. Canada has incorporated the international
definition of a Convention refugee into domestic law, the definition can be altered in the Canadian context through an amendment
to the Immigration Act. That amendment would not alter the definition at international law; Canada would simply go beyond what
is demanded of us under international treaty obligations.
Furthermore, Canadian decision makers must also interpret the
Convention in a manner consistent with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.55 The Immigration Act, like all federal legislation, must conform to Charter standards. This is further enforced
by section 3(f) of the Immigration Act which states:

3. It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration policy and the rules and regulations made under this Act
shall be designed and administered in such a manner as to
promote the domestic and international interests of
Canada recognizing the need ...
(f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to
Canada on either a permanent or temporary basis is
subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate in a manner inconsistent with the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms.
Immigration policy must be implemented in conformity with
the Charter which lists sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination
under section 15. There is no direct discrimination on the basis of
sex since women can establish their refugee claims under the same
enumerated categories as men. However, it could be argued that the
statute is under inclusive because it fails to accommodate the
differences between men and women refugees. The Convention
refugee definition which is incorporated into Canadian law does not
accord protection for women fleeing domestic violence, an exclusively female experience. Stairs and Pope argue that decision
makers can provide international protection without violating the
Charter through a liberal interpretation of particular social group,
well founded fear of persecution, and state protection.56 This is also
54 Quoted in Oziewicz, supra note 50.

55 Part I of the Comtitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K), 1982, c. 11.
56 Supra note 36 at 165.
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the position of the new guidelines. Considering the restrictions
being placed on the definition of a particular social group, and the
uncertainty in the application of the concept by the courts, it may be
preferable to use the Charter to argue for explicit recognition of
gender in the definition of a Convention refugee.
It is advised that gender-based persecution be dealt with separately. Doreen Indra argues that Canadian refugee policy has systematically neglected gender as a critical consideration.57 Refugee
categories have been shaped predominately by the male refugee experience. It is important that women's experiences be recognized as
distinct. Women should not be invisible within the immigration
system, and dealing with gender-based persecution separately forces
a recognition of the particular position of women which otherwise
could be too easily overlooked.
Then Minister of Immigration, Bernard Valcourt, expressed
some concern that in dealing with gender-based persecution, Canada
needs to be sensitive to cultural differences and should not impose
its values on other countries.5 8 Ed Broadbent, Director of the
International Centre for Human Rights, addressed this concern,
stating:
We're not talking about forcing Saudi Arabia to change
its behaviour, we're talking about our own government
changing its domestic practices when it comes to refugee
law to be consistent with what we believe. 59

While Canada needs to respect other cultures, we also have an ethical obligation to promote human rights.
The particular position of the refugee claimant should not be
overlooked when that refugee is a woman who clearly defines her
treatment as gender-based persecution. Thus, it is not primarily the
Canadian state defining what constitutes persecution in the foreign
context. The Canadian state should respect the view of the refugee
claimant especially where it corresponds to our own value system.
Bernard Valcourt also expressed some concern that allowing
persecuted women to claim refugee status on the basis of sex would

57 D. Indra "Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience" (1987) 6
Refuge 3 at 3.
58 Canadian Press (29 January 1993).
59 Canadian Press (24 January 1993).
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lead to a strain on the immigration system. 60 Rebecca Cook, a
University of Toronto law professor, expressed similar sentiments:
Generosity, while a good idea in principle could also
create a refugee flood because of widespread oppression
of women around the world.6 1

This position may be somewhat overstated and is explicitly
rejected in the guidelines. Section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Immigration Act
states that the claimant must be "outside the country of that person's
nationality" to apply for refugee status. The majority of women
suffering gender-based persecution simply do not have the resources
to leave their oppressive situation in order to claim refugee status in
Canada.
Furthermore, under section 2(1)(a), the refugee claimant must
establish a well founded fear of persecution and their state's unwillingness or inability to protect them. The cases decided under the
new guidelines indicate that this is a significant burden to discharge. This is, thus, a further check on any potential flood of
women wishing to claim refugee status.
Some critics feel that the floodgates argument is flawed philosophically. David Neal argues that, on a conceptual level, asylum
under the Convention refugee definition is designed as an individual, not a class remedy. Class size, therefore, should not be a fundamental concern. He states:
In other words, while country conditions must play an
evidentiary role, they are not determinative. As they
should not require, so should they not preclude the granting of asylum. 62

James Hathaway emphasizes that we should determine membership in a particular social group using the ejusdem generis principle. Thus, we should extend protection to those persons whose civil
and political status puts them at comparable risk to those in other
enumerated categories. He argues, therefore, that sex-based claims
should not be defeated by the flood gates argument since race, nationality, religion, and political opinion are also characteristics
shared by large numbers of people. 63 The floodgates argument
Canadian Press (25 January 1993).
Ibid.
62 Neal, supra note IO at 240.
63 Hathaway, supra note 11 at 163.

60
61
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should not stand as an impediment to the inclusion of sex as a
ground for claiming refugee status.
CONCLUSION

Gender-based persecution is a pressing social problem which generates refugees. Canada needs to develop a refugee system sensitive to
the needs of female refugee claimants, and one able to deal effectively with gender-based claims.
The new guidelines are a positive step toward dealing with gender-based persecution. However, they do not provide an adequate
substitute for a legislative initiative. Ideally, gender-based persecution should be addressed through the explicit addition of sex to the
list of enumerated categories, either by amending the Immigration
Act, or by mounting a Charter challenge and forcing its amendment.
This would provide the maximum protection for women and ensure
that women are not rendered invisible by a system which does not
explicitly acknowledge the experiences of women refugees. A
legislative provision is more permanent because the procedure for
amendment and revocation is more formal than that of guidelines,
and legislation is binding on both tribunals and courts.
The decisions under the new guidelines in N. (L. Y.) (ReJ 4 and
A. (I.E.) (Ref'5 demonstrate that it is not sufficient to focus exclusively on including sex within religion, political opinion or
membership in a particular social group as grounds for claiming
refugee status. More women have been able to establish a ground for
claiming refugee status since the guidelines have been implemented.
However, the liberalization of refugee policy on gender-based persecution has been hindered by the stringent application of the tests
of what constitutes persecution and state complicity. The rigid
application of these tests has served to disqualify many of the
women advancing claims of gender-based persecution. In searching
for answers to gender bias in the refugee determination system, the
ability of human rights advocates to place effective political
pressure on the government is the key determining factor.
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